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Abstract
This article explores the complex relationship between transnational elites and civil society 
through examining the contrasting orientations of two cohorts of ‘elite graduates’ from Paris 
and Oxford. Both cohorts believe their privileged status has been earned through hard work 
and ability. But they are also aware that they have benefited from advantages not available to all. 
Perhaps because of this, they express the need to ‘give something back’. However, the means 
through which they seek to discharge their social responsibilities are very different. While the 
Oxford graduates seek to ‘give something back’ through volunteering and third sector engagement, 
the Paris graduates will ‘give something back’ through public service. The article discusses how 
the contrasting relationship between the state, civil society and the education system in these 
two countries may shape dispositions, and speculates on the extent to which these elite recruits’ 
commitment to ‘give something back’ will make a difference.
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This article addresses current debates around the changing relationship between elites 
and civil society within the context of increasing globalization. Various social theorists 
have pointed to the ways in which processes of ‘deterritorialization’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1972), ‘transnationalism’ (Schiller et al., 1992) and the ‘hollowing out of the 
state’ (Rhodes, 1994) are reconfiguring citizens and citizenship. Of course, as Falk 
(1993) notes, citizenship has always been an ‘uneven experience’ – varying across social 
groups and over time. The forms and prospects of transnational citizenship experienced 
by elites are likely to be very different from and less precarious than those experienced 
by the dispossessed migrants and refugees. But even among transnational elites, there are 
notable shifts in their relationship with the changing globalized landscape.
Falk (1993) argues that before the Second World War, elite citizens with international 
orientations were very much ‘global reformers’ who acted as advocates of global respon-
sibility.1 They were, he claims, ‘a worried and idealistic component of the elite’ (1993: 
42). In more recent decades, Falk argues that the ‘global reformer’ has been gradually 
replaced by the ‘man or woman of transnational affairs’ – unified around common busi-
ness and financial interests. Certainly, much has been written about the rise of a transna-
tional elite comprised of talented young graduates pursuing ‘boundaryless careers’ in a 
global ‘war for talent’ (e.g. Brown and Hesketh, 2004; Brown et al., 2011; Doyle and 
Nathan, 2001; Favell, 2008; Sassen, 2001).
There are concerns, though, that as these ‘bright young things’ pursue their interna-
tional careers, they will have limited national allegiances and little sense of social respon-
sibility. Falk (1993: 44), for instance, claims that unlike the ‘global reformers’ of previous 
generations, these new men and women of ‘international affairs’ comprise ‘a denational-
ized global elite that is virtually without any sense of global civic responsibility’. Others 
fear that these new transnational elites will not only lack global obligations, but that they 
will have limited national allegiances and little sense of social responsibility for those 
left behind ‘at home’. Over 20 years ago, Robert Reich (1992: 302) spoke of the ‘darker 
side of cosmopolitanism’ in which transnational professionals:
… may never develop the habits and attitudes of social responsibility. They will be world 
citizens, but without accepting or even acknowledging any of the obligations that citizenship in 
a polity normally implies.
As Freeland (2011: 2) argues of what she calls the ‘new super-elite’:
Its members are hardworking, highly educated, jet-setting meritocrats who feel they are the 
deserving winners of a tough, worldwide economic competition – and many of them, as a 
result, have an ambivalent attitude toward those of us who didn’t succeed so spectacularly. 
Perhaps most noteworthy, they are becoming a transglobal community of peers who have more 
in common with one another than with their countrymen back home … today’s super-rich are 
increasingly a nation unto themselves.
Power et al. 307
Despite the apparent consensus about the emergence of this transnational elite, there is 
relatively little empirical research on how their social responsibilities and citizen obliga-
tions are actually being reconfigured. And while there is little doubt that we are seeing 
forms of deterritorialization, this does not necessarily mean that the national differences 
have disappeared. Indeed, as Yeoh and Willis (2005: 72) point out, ‘far from heralding 
the death of geographical location, global competition has only rendered relativities of 
place more, not less, important’.
Sassen (2003) argues the ‘global’ may be embedded into nation-states in different 
ways and that it is important to look at the specificities of changing forms of citizenship. 
We need to trace ‘micro-transformations in the institution of citizenship on the inside of 
the national state (rather than the outside, as in post-national conceptions)’ (Sassen, 
2003: 246).
In this article we attempt to explore some of the elements of these ‘micro-transforma-
tions’ through comparing the orientation and dispositions of two ‘matched’ cohorts of 
French and British elite graduates – people who might be considered recruits to this new 
global elite. France and England provide fascinating contexts in which to undertake com-
parative research. Although geographically very close and having broadly similar demo-
graphic and economic profiles, the two countries are culturally and politically very 
different. As Gordon and Meunier (2004) outline, the UK has long been seen to embrace 
a laissez-faire approach to the economy in which, as Adam Smith famously put it, The 
Wealth of Nations should be left to the ‘invisible hand’ of the market and state involve-
ment kept minimal. France, by contrast, has long been associated with a dirigiste 
approach, not only to the economy but to many aspects of social life. France, at least 
rhetorically, upholds the virtues of order and regulation; the UK favours deregulation of 
the market. For France, the collective is privileged; for the UK, the individual is para-
mount (Gordon and Meunier, 2004). Not surprisingly, these two countries have posi-
tioned themselves differently in relation to the rise of the global economy – while the UK 
has tended to embrace global markets, France has been far more ambivalent towards 
globalization – and in particular Americanization (Meunier, 2004) and sought to retain 
elements of dirigiste control (Clift, 2006).
We have explored elsewhere (Power et al., 2013) how contrasts between France and 
England appear to influence young graduates’ international aspirations, but here we look 
at their sentiments of privilege and social responsibility. To what extent do these elite 
recruits consider themselves to be, as Freeland suggests, ‘deserving winners’? Do they 
display ambivalence about their own success relative to those who are less successful? 
Have they developed any of the ‘attitudes of social responsibility’ or accepted some of 
the ‘obligations’ to which Reich alludes?
Examining the attitudes and aspirations of the transnational elite is sociologically 
important. As Sassen (2005) argues, these are the ‘emergent social forces’, whose dispo-
sitions and orientations will have far-reaching consequences. Their trajectories not only 
help us trace the flows of globalization, they also have significance for those who are 
‘left behind’. As Giddens (1998: 105) has argued: ‘Exclusion at the top is not only just as 
threatening for public space, or common solidarity, as exclusion at the bottom end; it is 
causally linked to it.’ He argues that the withdrawal of those at the ‘top end’ from various 
aspects of civil society will have negative consequences for inequality.
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The research
The data from which this article draws derive from a larger research project2 on the ways 
in which graduate employability and talent are conceived by elite graduates and employ-
ers in Britain and France. This project has involved interviewing 40 elite graduates (in 
their own language) about their backgrounds, career plans, personal aspirations and per-
spectives on meritocracy and inequality. We outline below the reasons for the selection 
of the countries, the institutions and the courses; the attributes of our respondents and the 
mode of data collection and analysis.
In order to highlight the national contextual differences in orientations to citizenship, 
we have attempted to make our comparisons across two cohorts of students that have 
been ‘matched’ as closely as possible on the basis of the status of the institution and the 
career orientation of the degree courses.
Institutions and courses
In England, we interviewed a cohort of 20 final year students taking Bachelor’s degrees 
in History and Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) at the University of Oxford. In 
France, we interviewed a cohort of 20 students taking the Master’s in Political 
Administration at Sciences-Po, Paris. Both Sciences-Po and Oxford would count them-
selves as elite institutions. They reside at the top end of not only national but interna-
tional league tables of prestige. In relation to the 2015 World University Rankings (QS, 
2015) for political science, for example, Oxford takes third place (after Harvard and 
Princeton) and Sciences-Po, fifth place (just ‘behind’ the London School of Economics 
and Political Science). Both institutions would claim to be ‘global universities’ and, 
because of their reputations, both are highly academically selective.
Not only are both institutions of roughly equivalent status and selectivity, there are 
strong parallels between the degree courses our respondents are taking. The Master’s in 
Political Administration at Sciences-Po prepares students for careers in public adminis-
tration. Its curriculum includes courses in public law, economics and public finance with 
extended internships in key national and international organizations. Most importantly, it 
is the principal pathway to the École Nationale d’Administration (ÉNA) (Eymeri, 2001) 
– the foundation for what is satirically referred to as France’s ‘énarchy’. In short, 
Sciences-Po provides entry to Bourdieu’s (1998) State Nobility. Indeed, it is the alma 
mater of 13 of the 21 prime ministers of the Fifth Republic. Only two of the seven presi-
dents of the Fifth Republic are not Sciences-Po graduates.
Oxford, along with Cambridge (collectively referred to as Oxbridge), does not have 
quite the same explicit link to elite formation enjoyed by graduates of the French 
grandes écoles – but the association between having an Oxbridge degree and access to 
elite occupations is close. A recent report (Milburn, 2014) reveals that while Oxbridge 
graduates account for less than 1% of the population, they comprise 75% of British 
judges and 59% of government ministers in the last administration. Oxford’s PPE in 
particular has a reputation for feeding graduates into high political office (e.g. Kelly, 
2010). David Cameron, the current prime minister, holds a PPE degree, as do seven 
members of his Cabinet.
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The respondents
Our 40 interviewees responded to an invitation to participate in the research and while 
we cannot therefore guarantee that they are fully representative of the course members, 
their overall profile matches that of the institutions as a whole. Despite attempts in both 
countries to widen participation, both institutions recruit disproportionate numbers of 
privately educated students from socially privileged backgrounds. Our respondents can 
therefore be considered ‘elite’ not only by virtue of their entry to an elite institution, but 
in terms of their socio-economic backgrounds. All but one of our 20 Oxford respondents 
(13 male, 7 female) come from solidly middle-class families where at least one parent is 
in a high level professional or managerial occupation. At Sciences-Po, our 20 respond-
ents (12 male, 8 female) also come predominantly from advantaged public sector back-
grounds, with a significant number of parents in senior positions in public administration, 
education and health. In terms of traditional occupational groupings, both cohorts are by 
and large the children of parents from ‘Class 1’ occupational groupings – whether it is the 
‘higher grade professionals’ of Goldthorpe’s (1973) UK-based schema or the ‘instititeurs 
et professions intellectuelles diverses’ of the French schema (INSEE, 1977). In terms of 
more recent categorizations, our respondents would certainly fall within the ‘elite’ cate-
gory of Savage et al.’s (2013) new typology of social classes. Both cohorts are over-
whelmingly white.
Mode of data collection and analysis
Each of the respondents was interviewed individually in a place of their choosing – 
sometimes within their institution, but also within local cafes and bars. The interview 
schedule was semi-structured – comprising a series of common questions on their back-
ground, aspirations and perceptions of the nature of the labour market they were about to 
enter. The Oxford-based interviews were undertaken in English and the Paris-based ones 
in French. All interviews were recorded and transcribed with the analysis carried out in 
both French and English.
Clearly the semi-structured nature of the interview foreshadowed particular research 
directions, but we were alert to unanticipated themes emerging. Although we had antici-
pated there would be national differences between our French and Oxford cohorts, we 
did not foresee the differences being quite as pronounced as they turned out to be. For 
example, the main theme of this article emerged from reading the transcripts rather than 
being structured into the interview from the beginning.
In the following section, we examine how these likely recruits to the transnational 
elite attempt to reconcile their own social and educational privileges with those who, as 
Freeland (2011) puts it, ‘didn’t succeed so spectacularly’ within two national contexts 
that are characterized by high and increasing levels of social inequality.
Deserving winners?
All of our Oxford and Parisian graduates were cognizant of their prestigious educational 
status and the high-flying careers it opened up for them. Many had already enjoyed 
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internationally based internships and accepted posts in multinational companies. In 
general, Freeland’s observation that members of the transglobal elite feel themselves to 
be ‘deserving winners’ in the economic competition for elite jobs holds true for our 
respondents. They felt they were ‘worthy’ of their privileged educational career and 
elite aspirations (Brown et al., 2014). They emphasized the importance of their intel-
lectual abilities – and particularly their hard work – in getting them this far. Typical 
comments include:
I think that probably I do like have some kind of natural intelligence or something but obviously 
in order to get this far. I have also had to work. (Natalie, 5/20 Oxford)
I am pretty good at my subject but I work really hard for it … And if you are here you are 
definitely good enough, you just need to work hard enough in order to you know achieve your 
potential actually. (Colin, 18/20 Oxford)
I got selected in the exams through hard work. I am not bad basically. One should not hide 
oneself … It is for others to say that someone is talented. I think I am good at science subjects 
and that I have worked on them. (Virginie, 17/20 Sciences-Po)
… the talent that helps you to succeed at something in every field is reinforced by hard work … 
I find it difficult to believe that someone gets into ENA without working. (Giselle, 18/20 
Sciences-Po)
In general, our respondents did not question the legitimacy of their own achievements – 
or of the various selection procedures that had successfully filtered out ‘less deserving’ 
candidates. Despite ongoing concerns about the recruitment policies of these elite insti-
tutions (e.g. Nanni, 2015; Parel and Ball, 2013), all our respondents thought that the 
selection processes which had brought them to Oxford or Sciences-Po were largely meri-
tocratic. The French students in particular argued strongly that their ‘concours’ was the 
fairest and most equitable means of selection – a position which is somewhat at odds 
with Erikson et al.’s (1979, 1982) comparative research on social mobility which indi-
cates that historically France has a stronger pattern of self-recruitment in the ‘top end’ 
than England.
So, while our respondents generally believed that they deserved to be where they are, 
they simultaneously acknowledged that they had not competed on a completely ‘level 
playing field’. Many talked about benefiting from parents who had encouraged them or 
who had the resources to supplement their education, e.g.
… you should be in a family that encourages education. Which would follow the children, from 
a very young age, to intellectually stimulate them and ensure that they succeed in the education 
system. That could be sending the bright children to learn German or Latin to stimulate them. 
In this regard, there is a social bias on the whole. (Giles, 16/20 Sciences-Po)
There is the question of parents financing more private lessons at an early stage, followed by 
private preparation. In the main, candidates who have undergone private preparation clear the 
Sciences-Po exam. (Alain, 3/20 Sciences-Po)
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Many respondents, and particularly those at Oxford, spoke of the variable quality of 
schools and the advantages they had received from having attended a ‘good’ school.
I have had a really good education and here I am, there are very few people here who have come 
from you know poor state schools and succeeded. (Colin, 18/20 Oxford)
I like went to a really good school and I had really good teachers and so yes in a way it was just 
there for me to take. (Natalie, 15/20, Oxford)
Because I had access to quality education which is not comparable. (Nicolas, 19/20 Sciences-Po)
One of our French graduates mentioned geographical inequalities:
There is a phenomenon of social and geographical segregation. When you are in a big Parisian 
high school, even if your parents are not necessarily rich, you have more chances of joining a 
preparatory class if you are better than a good student from Lozère. (Aurélie, 13/20 Sciences-Po)
However, alongside these inequalities, the overwhelming majority also spoke of the 
importance of ‘luck’ in their educational careers, e.g.
I think one thing that strikes me in particularly being here and coming towards the end of my 
final year in Oxford is actually how lucky and random this process has been. (Tim, 17/20 
Oxford)
I think you do definitely need to be talented, but I also think you need, you do also need to be 
lucky as well. (Stuart, 3/20 Oxford)
I would say that I have been extremely lucky. (Nicolas, 19/20, Sciences-Po)
We were just lucky at one point in time to get admission into a good school. (Monique, 15/20 
Sciences-Po)
The use of ‘luck’ as an explanation for success is significant because it signals an 
acknowledgement of the uneven distribution of opportunities at the same as overlooking 
more structural explanations for that maldistribution. As Brown et al. (2014: 10) argue: 
the emphasis on luck can be seen as the ‘ “individualisation” of the systematic inequali-
ties in education and life-chance’.
Perhaps because of the difficulty of reconciling their privileged status with what they 
saw as the relative arbitrariness of good fortune, many of our elite recruits spoke of the 
importance of using their talents in a ‘socially responsible’ way and the need to ‘give 
something back’.
Giving something back?
The form that this ‘giving back’ took is different for our Oxford and Parisian respondents. 
For our Oxford respondents, social responsibility is to be discharged through engaging in 
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civil society – and in particular the third sector and volunteering. For our Paris respond-
ents, social responsibility is to be discharged through public service to the state.
Oxford students and volunteering
In a practice which is now fairly widespread, many of our respondents had participated 
in volunteering during their ‘gap year’ – a time young people sometimes take between 
leaving school and going to university, e.g.
I took a gap year in which I worked with street children for a year in Bolivia … and that was 
really good, really, really challenging, really hard but I really enjoyed it … (Naomi, 16/20 
Oxford)
There have been a number of critiques of this kind of practice. As Simpson (2004: 681) 
notes, this ‘volunteer tourism’ enables young people ‘to combine the hedonism of tour-
ism with the altruism of development work’. It may also, as Heath (2007) claims, give 
those who are already advantaged and can afford to take a year out an even greater 
advantage in future selection and recruitment procedures. In addition, as Naomi goes on 
to say, Oxford gave her the opportunity to further extend her gap year experience of 
volunteering while at university:
Oxford has given me opportunities to do things that I wouldn’t have been able to do otherwise 
… for example getting involved with charity work. I went travelling over the summer which 
was partly funded by my college which I wouldn’t have been able to do otherwise. (Naomi, 
16/20 Oxford)
In common with most British universities, Oxford University actively encourages volun-
teering and, with the Students’ Union, supports a range of activities. For example, there 
is the ‘Oxford Hub’ where students volunteer to work with disadvantaged communities 
in the Oxford area. The following respondent talks about the importance of giving some-
thing back to local school children who have been less fortunate than her in their 
education:
So I have spent a lot of time organizing volunteering projects, so I have started a project where 
we teach maths to children at schools in Oxford at GCSE standard, so I know that has taught 
me a lot in terms of organizational skills and management and things like that. (Faith, 13/20 
Oxford)
Several intended to build on these experiences and work for charities or other third sector 
organizations in the future, e.g.
I am very interested in entrepreneurship, I was involved in the social enterprise last year, which 
was very interesting so I like the challenge of being in that. (Jack, 2/20 Oxford)
I want an international job, preferably kind of some sort of you know doing good, sort of 
charity work or some sort of way helping out. (Gerry, 20/20 Oxford)
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… I have been doing a bit of research as part of my work with a charitable organization into 
social enterprise and I think that I would love to set up a social enterprise that is actually useful 
and successful, that really would be a good thing to do I think. (Sarah, 11/20 Oxford)
I might also be interested further on in doing something within a charitable organization or I 
don’t know, something with a slightly more global, humanitarian social aspect but I am not sure 
what that is going to be exactly. (Mike, 19/20 Oxford)
The language of ‘social entrepreneurship’, rather than simply ‘charitable good works’, 
is revealing and perhaps reflects the largely private sector leanings of our Oxford gradu-
ates who were just about to begin careers in a variety of multinational corporations. 
Although the concept of ‘social entrepreneurship’ is contested, it generally emphasizes 
an affinity between business practice and social benefit – rather than seeing them as 
fundamentally opposed (e.g. Leadbeater, 1997). An affinity between business and social 
benefit was also evident in some of our Oxford respondents’ justifications for their 
career choices; so that even moving into a lucrative private sector occupation could be 
reconciled with the need to ‘give something back’ where the company engaged in forms 
of ‘social entrepreneurship’.
As Juliette comments on her future career in a large corporation specializing in invest-
ment banking:
Although they are a bank they do take corporate social responsibility seriously and it is 
something that they really do kind of work at. Obviously it has got business interest to it and 
they make a profit from it, but the fact that you know you might as well do something good 
whilst making a profit rather than just exploiting people and so I do quite like that aspect of it. 
(Juliette, 12/20 Oxford)
Sciences-Po students and public service
In general, references to charitable work and volunteering were far less prevalent in the 
narratives of our French graduates – either in terms of past experiences or future aspira-
tions. Only two of our Parisian graduates appeared to have done any volunteering (as 
distinct from internships) and only one other talked about a future in the third sector. 
However, this does not mean that they had no sense of the need to reconcile their privi-
leged status with social inequalities through ‘giving something back’. There was strong 
sense of duty in some of the narratives:
The French system allowed me to be where I am today … I have an obligation. As I do not 
consider myself talented, whatever I am today, I owe it to the surrounding my parents and 
grandparents are a part of. (Nicolas, 19/20 Sciences-Po)
My parents have also gone through some social ascent … I have had role models in the field of 
education in the family. And also economic ease. It is a blessing and also a duty to give back 
what you have received. (Stephanie, 20/20 Sciences-Po)
Well, I know that I come from a milieu that has allowed me to find myself. But there’s another 
reason for this: I studied in a public high school and prep class where the teachers put in an 
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enormous effort in educating us, and we received all this education without having to pay 
anything. ENS was a stage above. Here we were even paid to study. So I am completely aware 
of the opportunity that I’ve had, which was offered to me by the State and I feel indebted to it. 
These jobs not only motivate me, but also moreover, I want to give back to the State what I 
could receive. Civil service is my only interest. (Virginie, 17/20 Sciences-Po)
Unlike our Oxford respondents, our Sciences-Po respondents did not see any affinity 
between business practice and social benefit – indeed they saw the private sector as being 
injurious to the social good (Power et al., 2013). In general, our French respondents 
believed that social responsibility was to be discharged through working for the 
‘administration’:
It seems a little abstract this way, but my calling is to work for general interest or something that 
is beyond short-term individual interest. It motivates me more than money or short-term 
achievements. (René, 2/20 Sciences-Po)
I like the idea of public service. That is not completely hogwash. I like the idea of getting back 
home in the evening thinking today I did something that made a difference to someone, certainly 
I’ll not change the world (I am not a humanitarian …), but I did something that has helped 
someone somewhere. (Marie-Pierre, 5/20 Sciences-Po)
The interest is to work for the general interest for public service … It is rather to be at the 
service of citizens, even if that is very naïve to say. But it is this aspect that interests me more 
… the most important interest of civil service. (Arnaud, 6/20 Sciences-Po)
These contrasts in the narratives of our British and French graduates are supported by 
other research on engagement in volunteering. A number of comparative studies of 
volunteering (e.g. Anheier and Salamon, 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 
2001) have shown that rates of participation are much lower in France than they are in 
the UK. More recently, analysis of data from the European Social Survey (Round 6 
2012/13) on the relative frequency of engagement in volunteering shows that while 
57% of British respondents had never volunteered, this was the case for 68% of French 
respondents. The difference is even more marked for younger adults (those less than 26 
years old). While over half (52%) of the British respondents had engaged in volunteer-
ing in the previous 12 months, this was the case for only just over one quarter (29%) of 
the French respondents.3
Accounting for national differences
It is clear that while our French and British respondents share a sense of their own privi-
leges, the ways in which they envisage using their privileges to discharge their social 
responsibilities and make the world a better place are very different. Our Oxford students 
have clearly been socialized into believing that social responsibility to those less fortu-
nate should be discharged through various forms of social entrepreneurship, such as 
volunteering, while our Parisian students think that their responsibilities will be dis-
charged through public service in the form of working for the state.
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These contrasts are intriguing. First, they confirm other research by ourselves (Power 
et al., 2013) and others (e.g. Carroll and Fennema, 2002), that even among the ‘global 
elite’ national differences remain strong. Certainly, at this point in their careers, our two 
cohorts of elite recruits do not support Freeland’s (2011: 2) fear that they may become ‘a 
nation unto themselves’. But the strong divergence of attitudes towards social responsi-
bility may also indicate a very different configuration between the state and civil society 
in France and England.
Education and the state
The role of the education system is likely to be crucial here. As Green’s (1990) compara-
tive study has shown, France and England have very different histories. In France, the 
education system was put in place much earlier than in England. France’s education 
system was highly centralized – a powerful state apparatus geared to achieving the col-
lective goals of the nation-state. By contrast, throughout most of the 19th century it is 
difficult to speak of an English education system at all – either in terms of centrally 
organized provision or a national remit. For most of the century, England rejected a stat-
ist approach to education and settled for the more piecemeal development of voluntary 
sector and private provision. As Green (1990: 208) points out:
England was the last of the major nineteenth century powers to create a national system of 
education and the most reluctant to put it under public control.
England’s ambivalent attitude towards the role of the state in education is evident in 
recent policies which appear mark a return to the fragmented and diversified provision of 
the 19th century. The Conservative government is currently encouraging the growth of 
‘free schools’ – schools which are set up by willing groups of parents and voluntary 
associations and which operate outside the regulatory framework of local government. 
Moreover, and unlike France, there was no state intervention in what schools taught until 
well into the 20th century when the 1988 Education Reform Act introduced a National 
Curriculum for the first time. Even this intervention is now being reversed inasmuch as 
free schools do not need to apply the National Curriculum.
These very different histories brought about contrasting roles for schools in the develop-
ment of citizens. Mitchell (2003: 395) points out how the English educational system has 
had a limited role to play in the development of ‘citizens’ compared to other countries:
… public education was not called upon to assist in state formation either through the 
constitution of properly disciplined national subjects oriented towards a newly unified national 
identity.
Starkey and Osler (2009: 344) also point to how these differences are also manifest in the 
more recent introduction of explicit courses in citizenship in schools:
In both England and France, new programs of education for citizenship aim to reinforce and 
strengthen democracy. The French program is based on republican values, particularly human 
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rights, and emphasizes the unacceptability of racism and discrimination. The program for 
England emphasizes social and moral responsibility and active engagement with society.
At the higher education level, these differences are also evident. In England, there is a very 
loose articulation between the state and universities. In France, elite educational institu-
tions, and in particular the grandes écoles, have always had an intimate and idealized rela-
tionship with the state as the means by which elite positions would be allocated on the basis 
of merit rather than nepotism (Belhoste, 2002; van Zanten and Maxwell, 2015).
In terms of more recent developments, it is also likely that these differences are com-
pounded by contrasting funding regimes. In the UK, and in particular, England, students 
now make significant contributions to the cost of their own higher education – through 
successive fee increases and maintenance. In France, not only is higher education free, 
but our Sciences-Po students are salaried. These different funding regimes are likely to 
create very different sets of indebtedness and obligation. As one of our French respond-
ents points out:
I am paid for studying … it is not a salary but a loan from the State who has gambled on us and 
we owe something in return. (Stephanie, 20/20 Sciences-Po)
Not one of the Oxford respondents articulated any such sense of indebtedness to the 
state.
Civil society and the state
The contrasting dispositions of our French and English students may also relate to the 
different ways in which the third sector is situated in each context. Again the same con-
trasting traditions of liberalism and state control can be seen in the patterns of voluntary 
association activity and membership.
For example, two different analyses (Anheier and Salamon, 2001; Schofer and 
Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001) both explain the comparative rates of volunteering in terms 
of the different cultural repertoires of countries. In both studies, Britain’s relatively high 
levels of volunteering are seen to be related to a liberal third sector which stimulates 
voluntary sector activity and participation. In both, France’s more statist approach (char-
acterized as ‘corporatist’ by Anheier and Salamon, 2001) leads to a voluntary sector that 
is less pronounced. Jenkins and Cospey (1996: 112) argue that France reveals ‘the dan-
gers of a state-led process of nation-formation, which under different regimes has sought 
to impose the prevailing state ideology on to a recalcitrant “civil society” ’.
The significance of volunteering for the British cultural repertoire is explored by 
Pupavac (2010). She sees the mainstreaming of charitable work and volunteering in the 
UK as a distinctly British phenomenon whose roots lie deep in a long tradition of human-
itarianism. She argues that there has been an ongoing decline in shared national values 
and that humanitarianism ‘has come to the fore in official policies to promote a sense of 
Britishness’ (2010: 47). It is evident, she argues, in the wholesale incorporation of the 
virtues of charitable work into the school and the establishment – through the school cur-
riculum, through BBC programmes such as Comic Relief and Blue Peter ‘appeals’, and 
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through political campaigns, such as David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ initiative. Of par-
ticular relevance to this analysis are the ethnographic studies of elite schools which 
reveal widespread engagement in charitable work – national and international – through 
which students are to develop ‘imaginations of transnational mobility and cosmopolitan 
futures’ (Maxwell and Aggleton, 2015: 9; see also Brooks and Waters, 2015). And, as we 
saw with our Oxford respondents, universities are keen to encourage their students to 
undertake a range of volunteering activities – within their local communities and 
internationally.
Making a difference?
How one feels about the implications of these two contrasting orientations to social 
responsibility is likely to depend on one’s perceptions of the relative potential of the third 
sector and the state to make a difference for those who have not achieved the elevated 
status of our respondents.
There are many criticisms of the increasing recourse to the third sector as a means to 
improve social welfare. These range from concerns about the diminution of professional 
safeguards, creeping privatization to the abandonment of more systematic and universal 
interventions. In thinking about the limits of the kind of ‘giving back’ being undertaken 
by our Oxford respondents, we have found Pupavac’s (2010) critique of British humani-
tarianism very insightful. She argues that:
… its prominence in public life in various periods has coincided with the contraction of social 
concern and progressive politics, rather than their straightforward expansion. Its present 
conservative character, notwithstanding its radical self-perception, is influenced by the demise 
of progressive politics and disconnect from a popular social basis.
She goes on to argue that the contradictions in British humanitarianism, which she traces 
back to Wilberforce’s campaign to abolish slavery, can actually be attributed to British 
reaction to the French Revolution. In this way, antislavery became a ‘residual progres-
sive cause among former progressive members of the middle classes now fearful of radi-
cal political change’. She argues that ‘abolitionism answers the psychic needs of mill 
owners, giving them a sense of moral purpose although otherwise hardened to the imme-
diate suffering around them’. She draws on Whitaker’s (1983) history of Oxfam (an 
organization which perhaps not coincidently developed in Oxford) to show how the ‘pre-
dominantly middle class organisation lacking a solid basis in the working classes …. 
failed to win over non-academic Oxford’.
As Carey (1992) argues, British cultural elites have generally not concerned them-
selves with the plight of British urban populations. For our own advantaged respondents, 
there is a similar disconnect between their desire to ‘give something back’ and a willing-
ness to address the inequalities through which they have benefited. Perhaps the limits of 
this kind of philanthropy are perhaps most effectively summed up by Clement Attlee’s 
perception of nearly 100 years ago that ‘Charity is a cold grey loveless thing. If a rich 
man wants to help the poor, he should pay his taxes gladly, not dole out money at a whim’ 
(in Beckett, 2007: 63).
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If one sees the third sector as a form of creeping privatization and no substitute for the more 
radical, progressive and universal welfare that only national administrations can achieve, one 
might be more sympathetic to our French graduates’ orientation. Of course, there are limits 
here too and just as there are many criticisms of the third sector, so too there are many accounts 
of the ‘dark side’ of the state. Among our Sciences-Po graduates there will undoubtedly be a 
strong affinity between self-interest and public service. And despite their avowed allegiance to 
the state at this moment, past experience suggests that many will become ‘pantoufleurs’ and 
take lucrative ‘pay-offs’ as they move over to the private sector (Cole, 2005).
Additionally, despite their different allegiances, there is no indication that our respond-
ents’ desire to ‘give something back’ will involve a diminution of their own advantages. 
As we have seen, while there was a common recognition that inequalities in social oppor-
tunities and the educational system had contributed to these advantages, there was very 
little desire to alter the arrangements.
Given the likelihood that our elite graduates will earn very high salaries (e.g. Power 
et al., 2003), we were interested to see what they felt about earnings inequalities. In spite 
of Attlee’s exhortation that the best way to help the poor is to pay one’s taxes, there was 
little enthusiasm for any significant redistribution through increased taxation – even 
among our public sector-friendly French graduates. There was an almost universal rejec-
tion across both cohorts, for example, of any kind of earnings ‘cap’:
I don’t think there is necessarily anything unfair about having a very select group at the top that 
are very rich compared to the bottom … I don’t think the market is that efficient, but it’s 
probably the best of all possible systems … it’s probably the best of all the worst systems. 
(Jack, 2/20 Oxford)
I am comfortable with the idea that people, certain people earn more because the work they do 
commands greater remuneration, or it requires more rewards. (Stuart, 3/20 Oxford)
That’s how economics works essentially, isn’t it? … if you are an able builder, you should be 
earning more than a novice builder. Talent should be rewarded. (Roger, 1/20 Oxford)
I think it’s probably too high at the high end as well, but given the hours they put in, like an 
investment banker, if you did it in hourly wage, a lot of them would be earning minimum wage. 
(Emily, 8/20 Oxford)
Sadly, a ceiling at the national level would limit the competitivity of France or of any European 
countries adopting this method. (Alain, 3/20 Sciences-Po)
Even when injustices were acknowledged, even worse ones were identified, e.g.
… what I really find unjust is that a footballer earns 250 times more. I am not defending them 
but I think you should not just blame people, especially traders, who earn a lot of money. 
(Giselle, 18/20 Sciences-Po)
So, while there may be an inclination to ‘give something back’, it is not envisaged that 
this reconciliation will involve any diminution of their earnings and consequently any 
significant redistribution of resources.
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Conclusion
In this article we have tried to explore the various ways in which two highly advantaged 
groups of elite graduates in Paris and Oxford reconcile their privileges with a social and 
educational system characterized by significant inequalities. As we have seen, our two 
cohorts display common characteristics. Both Oxford and Sciences-Po respondents have 
a fairly astute sense of their own privilege. While they do ascribe much of their current 
elevated status to their own efforts (hard work, ability), they all generally acknowledge 
that they have benefited from either the unequal distribution of resources (educated par-
ents, an unequal education system) or simple ‘luck’. The acknowledgement of the per-
haps sometimes arbitrary circumstances that have led them to where they are now seems 
to have engendered a sense of obligation to ‘give something back’. However, at this 
point, the similarities in their narratives end – for the ways in which our Oxford and 
Sciences-Po respondents seek to discharge the ‘debt’ of their privilege are very different. 
Our Oxford respondents seek to ‘give something back’ through engaging in various vol-
untary activities and social entrepreneurship. In France, our Paris graduates plan to dis-
charge their debt through public service careers.
Accounting for these contrasts involves delving into the different histories of the 
relationship between the state, the education system and civil society in England and 
France – issues that can only be touched on in this article. Nevertheless, they indicate 
that there are different national cultural repertoires which mean that despite increasing 
internationalization, elite recruits bring with them different allegiances and different 
orientations to civil society. From an optimistic perspective, one might argue that these 
enduring national sentiments mean that Reich’s (1992) and Freeland’s (2011) fears 
about the demise of attitudes of social responsibility or the obligations of citizenship are 
unfounded. However, from a more pessimistic viewpoint, it is clear that what was being 
‘given back’ in both contexts is quite limited. Although mindful of their own good for-
tune and cognizant of inequalities within their countries, neither our French nor our 
British respondents were willing to envisage any significant redistribution of income 
that would be needed to ‘level out’ the playing field of access to elite higher education 
and elite occupations.
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Notes
1. Falk is writing from a US perspective. From a UK perspective, one would also need to add 
another kind of transnational elite, the ‘colonial elite’ of Commonwealth and Empire.
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2. ‘The Social Construction of Talent: A Comparative Study of Education, Recruitment and 
Occupational Elites’; a project funded through the ESRC Centre on Skills, Knowledge and 
Organisational Performance (SKOPE) based in Oxford and Cardiff Universities. www.skope.
ox.ac.uk.
3. I am grateful to my colleague Martijn Hogerbrugge for this analysis.
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Résumé
Cet article étudie la relation complexe qu’entretiennent les élites transnationales avec la société 
civile, en examinant les orientations contrastées de deux cohortes d’« étudiants d’élite » de 
Paris et d’Oxford. Si les deux cohortes considèrent que leur statut privilégié est le fruit de leurs 
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efforts et de leurs compétences, elles sont conscientes d’avoir également bénéficié de certains 
avantages que tout le monde n’a pas. C’est peut-être pour cela qu’elles expriment le besoin de « 
donner quelque chose en retour ». Cependant, les moyens par lesquels l’une et l’autre cohorte 
cherchent à assumer leurs responsabilités sociales diffèrent fortement. Tandis que les étudiants 
de la cohorte d’Oxford cherchent à « donner quelque chose en retour » en faisant du bénévolat 
et en s’engageant dans le tiers secteur, les étudiants de la cohorte de Paris envisagent de « donner 
quelque chose en retour » en travaillant pour la fonction publique. L’article étudie comment la 
relation différente entre l’État, la société civile et le système éducatif dans chacun des deux pays 
est à même d’influer sur les dispositions des uns et des autres, et examine dans quelle mesure 
l’attachement de ces membres de l’élite à « donner quelque chose en retour » est susceptible de 
changer les choses.
Mots-clés
Bénévolat, éducation, élite, étudiants, société civile
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza, compara, y explica las redes de poder corporativo formadas por la 
interconexión de consejos de administración en cinco economías de América Latina con el fin 
de comprender por qué las élites corporativas están conectadas por redes cohesionadas en 
algunos países y no en otros. Los resultados muestran redes de élites cohesionadas en México, 
Chile y, en cierta medida, en Perú, pero no en Brasil ni Colombia. Después de testar y rechazar 
las hipótesis de las teorías existentes, se ha hallado una relación de complementariedad entre 
la cohesión de las redes de la élite corporativa y las relaciones estado-empresas a través de 
asociaciones empresariales poderosas así como el grado de apertura comercial. En las economías 
en las que las relaciones estado-empresas están mediadas por fuertes asociaciones empresariales 
y están abiertas al libre comercio con las economías desarrolladas, las élites corporativas forman 
redes cohesionadas, mientras que en las economías con asociaciones empresariales débiles y 
baja apertura comercial, las élites empresariales no forman redes cohesionadas. Estas nuevas 
explicaciones resultan adecuadas para descifrar redes de poder corporativo en las economías 
emergentes, y un punto de referencia para futuros estudios sobre elites corporativas.
Palabras clave
América Latina, consejos de administración interconectados, economías emergentes, élites 
corporativas, redes de élites
